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Serving Two Masters: Commercial Hues and Tax
Exempt Organizations*
Lawrence Zelenak**
No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one,
and love the other; or else he will hold to the one and despise
the other. Ye cannot serve both God and mammon.
Matthew 6:24
Many organizations claiming tax exempt status under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code' (I.R.C.) engage
solely or primarily in activities that both directly accomplish an
exempt purpose and earn a profit. A hospital, for example,
directly accomplishes an exempt charitable purpose by serving
the medical needs of its community, but it also may make a
profit from the fees it charges for its services. A college directly
accomplishes an exempt educational purpose by teaching its stu-
dents, but it may also make a profit from tuition receipts. The
Internal Revenue Service (the Service) and the courts have had
difficulty analyzing whether such organizations, which attempt
to do well and to do good at the same time, are entitled to
exempt status. The Service and the courts are concerned that
* At the time this title was chosen, the author was unaware of Derrick A. Bell's
article, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). The author trusts that Dean Bell does
not claim exclusive rights to the formula. The author is grateful to Boris Bittker,
Lawrence Brown, Edward Brunet, and Anthony Waters for their comments and
suggestions on various drafts of this article.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.
1. The I.R.C. defines tax exempt organizations as:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster... amateur sports com-
petition. . . , or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propa-
ganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation .... and which does
not participate in, or intervene in ... any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
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the pursuit of profit may be incompatible with operation exclu-
sively for exempt purposes; it is the old problem of serving two
masters.
In B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner,2 the Tax Court
explained the approach that it takes in ruling on the exempt sta-
tus of an organization whose sole or primary activity of selling
goods or services for a profit directly furthers an exempt
purpose:
The fact that petitioner's activity may constitute a trade or
business does not, of itself, disqualify it from classification
under section 501(c)(3), provided the activity furthers or
accomplishes an exempt purpose. Rather, the critical inquiry is
whether petitioner's primary purpose . . . is an exempt pur-
pose, or whether its primary purpose is the nonexempt one of
operating a commercial business producing net profits for peti-
tioner. This is a question of fact to be resolved on the basis of
all the evidence. . . . Factors such as the particular manner in
which an organization's activities are conducted, the commer-
cial hue of those activities, and the existence and amount of
annual or accumulated profits are relevant evidence of a for-
bidden predominant purpose.'
In one respect, this analysis has been modified by later Tax
Court decisions, which hold that an organization is not qualified
for exemption if it has a substantial nonexempt commercial pur-
pose. The commercial purpose need not be primary in order to
disqualify the organization.4 Regardless of how the test is articu-
lated, however, an organization whose activities strike the Ser-
vice and the courts as having too much of a "commercial hue"
will be denied tax exempt status on the theory that it has a sub-
stantial nonexempt commercial purpose.'
2. 70 T.C. 352 (1978).
3. Id. at 357 (footnotes and citations omitted).
4. Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1070, 1082
n.16 (1982), appeal docketed, No. 1759-81X (3d Cir. Dec. 23, 1982); Copyright Clearance
Center, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 793, 804 (1982).
5. It seems conceivable, under the B.S.W. Group, Inc. analysis, that an otherwise
qualified organization-such as a school or a hospital-could lose its exempt status
merely for trying to make a profit, even if the attempt were unsuccessful. Other factors
might indicate a predominant commercial purpose, even in the absence of a profit. If
such an organization were denied exempt status, it would have no tax liability (since it
operated at a loss), but it would lose the right to receive deductible charitable contribu-
tions. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1982). There do not appear, however, to be any instances of
the Service's challenging the exempt status of an unprofitable organization on the basis
that it possessed a forbidden commercial hue.
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The test described by the Tax Court in B.S. W. Group, Inc.
is not justified by the terms of section 501(c)(3). This article will
describe the statutory and regulatory framework of section
501(c)(3), examine how the test has been applied, criticize the
test, and suggest a test more in keeping with the language and
the spirit of section 501(c)(3). The proposed test is this: If the
questioned activity directly accomplishes an exempt purpose of
the organization, and if all profits from the activity are used in a
manner consistent with the organization's exempt purposes, 6
then the organization should be granted exempt status, whether
or not the organization's activities are imbued with a "commer-
cial hue."'
I. THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Organizations described in I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) are
exempt from federal income tax under section 501(a)8 and are
also eligible to receive tax deductible charitable contributions
under section 170. In order to be described in section 501(c)(3),
an organization must satisfy four statutory requirements. First,
it must be organized exclusively for one or more exempt pur-
poses (religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, educational, promoting amateur sports, or preventing
cruelty to animals)." Second, it must be operated exclusively for
one or more exempt purposes.10 Third, no part of its net earn-
6. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
7. For another analysis (based in part on the common law definition of "charitable")
concluding with a similar suggestion, see Note, Profitable Related Business Activities
and Charitable Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3), 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 270 (1976).
See also Desiderio, The Profitable Nonprofit Corporation: Business Activity and Tax
Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of I.R.C., 1 N.M.L. REv. 563 (1971). Desiderio
argues (with special emphasis on community development corporations) that an organi-
zation, otherwise qualified for exempt status, which engages in substantial business
activities intending to make a profit, is entitled to exemption under § 501(c)(3) as it
currently stands. However, he suggests an amendment to § 501(c)(3) to make such an
organization ineligible for exemption. Id. at 585-89. Finally, see the brief discussion of
this issue in Rogovin, The Charitable Enigma: Commercialism, U. SOUTHERN CAL. 17TH
ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 61, 80-82 (1965).
8. The exemption does not apply, however, to unrelated business income. See I.R.C.
§§ 511-14 (1982).
9. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (1960).
10. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1960); Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(d) (1960).
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ings may inure to the benefit of any private individual." Fourth,
it must observe the statutory restrictions on involvement in leg-
islative lobbying and political campaigns.' 2
The Service may challenge an organization engaged in busi-
ness activities for not satisfying the second of these require-
ments, the "operational test," which mandates that the organi-
zation be operated exclusively for exempt purposes. Under the
operational test, the organization's purposes, rather than its
activities, must qualify as exempt. The statutory language
requires that the organization be "operated exclusively" for
exempt "purposes."'"
No activity is inherently exempt or nonexempt. Whether an
activity is consistent with exempt status depends on the organi-
zation's purpose for engaging in that activity. The regulations
emphasize this crucial distinction between purpose and activity
by stating that an organization satisfies the operational test if its
activities accomplish one or more of the exempt purposes speci-
fied in section 501(c)(3). 14 Although the language of the statute
literally requires operation exclusively for exempt purposes, the
regulations indicate that an insubstantial nonexempt purpose
will not destroy an organization's exempt status.' 5
It follows from the focus on purposes rather than on activi-
ties, that the fact that an organization earns income by engaging
in a business should not automatically make it ineligible for
exemption." Engaging in a business is an activity that, like
many other activities, can be undertaken for exempt or nonex-
empt purposes. The regulations acknowledge that an organiza-
tion operating a trade or business may meet the requirements of
11. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-l(c) (1960); Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (1960).
12. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (1960).
13. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
14. An organization will be regarded as 'operated exclusively' for one or more
exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one
or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3). An organization
will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not
in furtherance of an exempt purpose.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1960).
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1960). Accord Better Business Bureau v.
United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) (the presence of a "single. . .[nonexempt] pur-
pose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption").
16. The mere fact that an organization has income does not make it ineligible for
exemption. If it did, there would be no point to § 501(c)(3), since the only organizations
that could qualify for exemption from income tax would be those with no income.
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section 501(c)(3) if the operation of the trade or business is in
furtherance of the organization's exempt purposes (unless the
organization's primary purpose is the carrying on of an unre-
lated trade or business). 17
Section 513(a) defines an unrelated trade or business as a
trade or business that is not substantially related to the accom-
plishment of the organization's exempt purposes (aside from the
use the organization makes of the profits).18 Such unrelated
trade or business income is taxed under I.R.C. sections 511-
514.19
This article considers business activities that are substan-
tially related to the accomplishment of an organization's exempt
purposes, and to which the tax on unrelated business income
therefore does not apply. Two examples of substantially related
business activities are the operation of a hospital by a charitable
organization and the operation of a college by an educational
organization. When the tax on unrelated business income
applies, it permits a compromise solution: imposition of a tax on
unrelated business income, but tax exemption for other income
and eligibility to receive deductible charitable contributions.
Such a compromise solution is not statutorily available when the
organization's major activity is conducting a business substan-
tially related to the organization's exempt purposes. Either the
organization is totally tax exempt, or it is not exempt at all.
B. Rulings and Case Law
The Service has emphasized its objection to exempt organi-
zations' commercial hues in several published rulings. In 19600
17. An organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3) although it
operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if the opera-
tion of such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization's exempt
purpose or purposes and if the organization is not organized or operated for
the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business, as defined
in section 513.
Treas Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (1960).
18. The term 'unrelated trade or business' means. . . any trade or business the
conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from the need of such
organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to
the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational,
or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption . ...
I.R.C. § 513(a) (1982). The "substantially related" standard is discussed in Tress. Reg. §
1.513-1(d)(2) (1967).
19. See infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
20. Rev. Rul. 60-351, 1960-2 C.B. 169.
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the Service ruled that a nonprofit organization that published a
foreign language magazine containing literary, scientific, and
educational articles was not exempt because the magazine was
sold to the general public through paid subscriptions. The ruling
explained: "[Tihe corporate activities .. are, per se, business
activities. They are devoted to publishing a magazine and selling
it to the general public in accordance with ordinary commercial
practices."'" This decision was cited with approval in a 1967 rul-
ing,2" which stated that an organization engaged in publishing
scientific and medical literature could qualify for exempt status
only if, among other things, "the manner in which the distribu-
tion is accomplished is distinguishable from ordinary commer-
cial publishing practices. ' 23 In 1977 the Service relied on that
reasoning in ruling that a nonprofit organization publishing an
ethnic newspaper was not entitled to exemption because the
organization's activities of publishing the newspaper, soliciting
advertising, and selling subscriptions, were "indistinguishable
from ordinary commercial publishing practices. 2 4
The analysis underlying these rulings is also reflected in the
Service's position in the reported cases. The Service has chal-
lenged, with mixed results, the exemptions of organizations
involved in many different kinds of business activities, on the
basis that the organizations possessed forbidden commercial
hues. Challenged activities have included producing plays,28
commercial farming, 6 operating a pharmacy, 7 manufacturing
21. Id. at 171.
22. Rev. Rul. 67-4, 1967-1 C.B. 121.
23. Id. at 122.
24. Rev. Rul. 77-4, 1977-1 C.B. 141 (citing Rev. Rul. 67-4, 1967-1 C.B. 121, 122).
25. Plumstead Theatre Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff'd, 675
F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982). The organization coproduced a play with the Kennedy Center.
The Tax Court rejected the Service's argument that the organization was disqualified
from exempt status because of the commercial manner in which the play was produced.
Id. at 1334.
26. Dumaine Farms v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 650 (1980). The organization operated
an experimental demonstration farm. The Tax Court rejected the Service's argument
that the organization was operated for the substantial nonexempt commercial purpose of
farming. Id. at 669.
27. Federation Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 687 (1979), aff'd, 625
F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980). The organization operated a pharmacy that sold drugs at a
discount to the elderly and the handicapped. The Eighth Circuit and the Tax Court
agreed with the Service that the organization had a substantial nonexempt commercial
purpose of selling drugs in direct competition with commercial drug stores. 625 F.2d at
808-09; 72 T.C. at 692-93.
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and selling pyrometric cones,2 8 aiding artists and artisans by
selling their works, 29 aiding the blind by selling their handi-
crafts,30 teaching and disseminating economic information by
selling publications containing investment advice,3 1 and provid-
ing consulting services for a fee to nonprofit organizations.3 2
The most frequent targets of the Service, however, have
been religious publishers. In a number of difficult to reconcile
cases, the courts have drawn fine factual distinctions between
exempt religious publishers 3 and those religious publishers with
too many commercial characteristics to qualify for exemption.34
28. Edward Orton, Jr., Ceramic Found. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 147 (1971). The
organization manufactured and sold pyrometric cones" used in ceramics and applied the
profits to ceramic engineering research. In a decision reviewed by the entire court, the
Tax Court held the organization qualified for exemption. Id. at 157-61.
29. See, e.g., Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 337 (1980). The
organization promoted art by exhibiting and selling artworks on commission at two art
galleries. The Tax Court rejected the Service's claim that commercial aspects of these
activities precluded exempt status. Id. at 346. See also Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 202 (1978). The organization purchased, imported, and sold handicrafts of
disadvantaged artisans. The Tax Court found that the organization qualified for exempt
status, despite the Service's contention that the organization possessed a substantial
nonexempt commercial purpose. Id. at 214.
30. Industrial Aid for the Blind v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 96 (1979). The organiza-
tion purchased and sold products manufactured at a workshop for the blind. The Tax
Court disagreed with the Service's position that its primary purpose was the nonexempt
purpose of carrying on a trade or business at a profit. Id. at 102.
31. American Inst. for Economic Research v. United States, 302 F.2d 934 (Ct. Cl.
1962). The organization published and sold periodicals containing investment advice.
The court found that the organization's primary purpose was commercial, and held that
the organization was not exempt. Id. at 938.
32. B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352 (1978). The organization's sole
planned activity was to sell consulting services, at or near cost, to nonprofit organiza-
tions. The Tax Court agreed with the Service that the organization's primary purpose
was commercial, which made it ineligible for exemption. Id. at 360-61.
33. See, e.g., Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1969). The
organization published and sold religious works of one author. The court held that the
organization was entitled to exempt status because its exempt purpose transcended the
profit motive. Id. at 124-25. See also Pulpit Resource v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 594
(1978). The organization's sole activity was publishing and selling a periodical devoted to
the improvement of preaching. In a lengthy opinion, the Tax Court agreed with the Ser-
vice that the organization had a commercial hue, but found that the commercial aspect
was so slight that it did not disqualify the organization from exemption. Id. at 611-12.
The court emphasized the lack of commercial competition, the small size of the profit,
and the sincerity and devotion of the organization's president. Id.
34. Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel Worker Soc'y v. United States, 510 F.
Supp. 374 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The organization published and
sold religious literature. In holding that the organization was nonexempt, the court
emphasized its increasing profits, its large accumulation of earnings, the high salaries of
its top officials, and its competition with commercial publishers. Id. at 378-79.
In Fides Publishers Ass'n v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1967) the
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Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioners
is a recent and typical example of the cases denying exempt sta-
tus to religious publishers. The organization published books
relating to the Presbyterian faith. Book prices were set so that
the organization would not lose money on any sales, even those
at maximum discount.86 The organization, which had been
founded in 1931, greatly expanded the scale of its operations
during the 1970s. Wages and salaries rose from nothing in 1970,
to $57,000 in 1979, with the highest single salary at $15,350.27
Royalties paid to authors grew from $350 in 1969 to $82,127 in
1979.88 Net profits on book sales rose from nothing for years
prior to 1969, to a high of $106,180 in 1975.39 Cash on hand rose
from $14,890 in 1969, to a high of $417,844 in 1976, before
declining to $111,826 in 1979.40 The decrease between 1976 and
1979 resulted from the use of cash to build a new office and
warehouse to keep pace with expanding operations. 1
The Tax Court framed the crucial issue as whether the
organization had a substantial nonexempt commercial purpose
for engaging in the business of publishing and selling religious
books."2 The court noted that a single activity may further both
exempt and nonexempt purposes, and that exemption must be
denied if the activity furthers a substantial nonexempt pur-
pose.43 Foreshadowing the result it would reach, the Court
remarked:
If... an organization's management decisions replicate those
of commercial enterprises, it is a fair inference that at least one
purpose is commercial, and hence nonexempt. And if this non-
exempt goal is substantial, tax exempt status must be denied.
organization published and sold Roman Catholic literature as its sole activity. The court
held that the publication and sale of religious literature at a profit was a substantial
nonexempt purpose, making the organization ineligible for exempt status. Id. at 936.
See also Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962). Scripture Press was a religious publishing house, specializ-
ing in teaching materials. In determining that the organization was not exempt, the court
emphasized its impressive profits and large accumulations of earnings. Id. at 803.
35. 79 T.C. 1070 (1982), appeal docketed, No. 1759-81X (3d Cir. Dec. 23, 1982).
36. Id. at 1079.
37. Id. at 1074-75.
38. Id. at 1079.
39. Id. at 1077.
40. Id. at 1078.
41. Id. at 1076.
42. Id. at 1082-83.
43. Id. at 1082.
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Clearly petitioner's conduct of a growing and very profita-
ble publishing business must embue [sic] it with some commer-
cial hue."
The court went on to observe that the organization pos-
sessed numerous characteristics indicative of a forbidden com-
mercial purpose: the making of substantial profits;' 5 never
charging below cost;' 6 competing with commercial publishers; 7
expanding by searching out more readers and acquiring a larger
facility;' 8 paying wages to workers, royalties to authors, and
entering into formal contracts with authors;' 9 dropping plans
that lost money;50 and publishing some nondenominational
works.51 The court did not treat any one of these characteristics
as conclusive, but held that all the characteristics, taken
together, indicated that the organization's "substantial, and
indeed, primary purpose was the nonexempt one of selling reli-
gious literature at a profit. '"12 The court acknowledged that
expansion could help the organization further its exempt reli-
gious purpose,53 and it claimed to reject the notion that seemed
implicit in the Service's arguments, that efficiency and success
automatically negate tax exempt status." Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the organization's commercial methods
reflected a substantial commercial purpose, thus disqualifying
the organization from exempt status.5
C. Absence of Exempt Purpose or Presence of Nonexempt
Purpose?
The usual approach of the Service and the courts, when
denying exempt status to an organization operating a profitable
activity that directly accomplishes an exempt purpose, has not
been to claim that the organization lacks an exempt purpose.
44. Id. at 1083.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1084-85.
47. Id. at 1085.
48. Id. at 1086.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The nondenominational works were Christian, but not specifically
Presbyterian.
52. Id. at 1087.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
1981
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Rather, the claim has been that the organization is not operated
exclusively for exempt purposes, because it also has a substan-
tial nonexempt commercial purpose." At first glance, the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Bob Jones University v.
United States57 might seem to support a different argument:
that an organization whose primary or sole activity is selling
goods or services at a profit should be denied exempt status
because it is totally lacking in any exempt purpose.
In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court determined that section
501(c)(3) incorporates elements of the common law of charitable
trusts." Any organization claiming exempt status, the Court
held, must satisfy those incorporated elements. Thus, any
exempt organization-even a religious, educational, or scientific
organization-must be charitable in the common law sense.5 9
The requirement that an exempt organization must be charita-
ble in the common law sense is in addition to the requirement
that the organization be organized and operated for one of the
eight categories of exempt purposes specified by Congress.6
The decision in Bob Jones could be used to support the fol-
lowing argument: If all exempt organizations must be charitable,
and if selling goods or services at a profit is not charitable, then
no organization whose sole or primary activity is engaging in
such sales can qualify for exemption. The problem with this
analysis is that the second premise is incorrect. To be charitable
in the common law sense, an organization need not give any-
thing away or sell anything at or below cost. The Supreme Court
in Bob Jones held only that all exempt organizations must be
charitable in the sense that they confer a public benefit and that
they not be illegal or violate established public policy."1 The
Court did not state that selling goods or services at a profit nec-
essarily negates the existence of a charitable purpose, and, in
fact, such a statement would have been at odds with the com-
56. See supra notes 20-55 and accompanying text.
57. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
58. Such an examination reveals unmistakable evidence that underlying all rel-
evant parts of the Code is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption
depends on meeting certain common law standards of charity-namely, that
an institution seeking tax exempt status must serve a public purpose and not
be contrary to established public policy.
Id. at 2026.
59. Id. at 2025-29.
60. Id. at 2029 n.19.
61. Id. at 2025-29.
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mon law of charitable trusts.
Under the common law concept of charity, any activity that
benefits the community may be considered charitable.2 The Bob
Jones opinion" quotes Lord MacNaghten, in Commissioners v.
Pemsel,e4 to the effect that charitable purposes include relief of
poverty, advancement of education, advancement of religion,
and any other purpose beneficial to the community. With chari-
table purposes so broadly described, an activity involving the
sale of goods or services at a profit does not necessarily lack a
charitable purpose. 65
The Service acknowledged this point when it ruled that a
hospital was operated in furtherance of the charitable purpose of
the promotion of health, even though the hospital denied non-
emergency treatment to indigents and operated at a profit." The
hospital's profits were used for expansion, replacement of facili-
ties and equipment, debt amortization, improvement of patient
care, medical training, education, and research.6 7 In a recent rev-
enue ruling, 8 the Service extended this rationale to a hospital
that completely denied service to those unable to pay6 and that
operated at a profit. The Service ruled that the hospital was
nevertheless exempt, because the "promotion of health is con-
sidered to be a charitable purpose," and "the hospital promotes
the health of a sufficiently broad class of persons to benefit the
community. 7 0
In sum, there is little support for the argument that an
organization necessarily lacks an exempt purpose if its sole or
primary activity is the sale of goods or services at a profit. In
fact, the attack of the Service and the courts against such orga-
nizations has not been that they lack exempt purposes, but that
they may also possess substantial nonexempt purposes.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2027.
64. 1891 A.C. 531, 583.
65. See Note, supra note 7, at 272-74.
66. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
67. Id. at 117. In Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), the
Supreme Court held that low-income individuals and organizations representing them
lacked standing to challenge Rev. Rul. 69-545. Id. at 46.
68. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
69. The hospital did not operate an emergency room because the community
already had adequate emergency room facilities. Id. at 94.
70. Id.
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II. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH OF THE
SERVICE AND THE COURTS
A. The Approach Confuses Means with Ends
The Service and the courts assume that an organization
operating a profitable business has as one of its purposes the
nonexempt purpose of operating a business for a profit. Once
this assumption is made, the organization can qualify for exemp-
tion only if its nonexempt purpose is not substantial.7'
This analysis ignores the crucial distinction between pur-
poses and activities drawn in section 501(c)(3). It is not the
activity itself, but the purpose behind the activity, that must be
exempt.7 2 The nature of the activity must be considered, of
course, in determining the purpose behind the activity. In that
sense, the nature of the activity is relevant to the determination
of whether the purpose is exempt; it is not, however, conclusive.
Engaging in a business is merely an activity. Contrary to the
assumption of the Service and the courts, that activity does not
necessarily indicate the presence of a nonexempt commercial
purpose.
Imagine a hospital, school, or religious publisher that dis-
tributes its goods or services free of charge. The Service would
readily acknowledge that such an organization is operated solely
for exempt purposes, because its activities directly accomplish
an exempt charitable (hospital), educational (school), or reli-
gious (religious publisher) purpose. The commercialism issue
arises only when such an organization-which would clearly
qualify for exemption aside from concerns about commercial
hues-charges fees and as a result earns a profit. The question,
then, is whether an organization, which would qualify for
exemption if it did not charge fees and earn a profit, can be dis-
qualified because it charges fees and earns a profit.
71. Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel Worker Soc'y v. United States, 510 F.
Supp. 374, 378 (D.D.C.), af'd, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Fides Publishers Ass'n v.
United States, 263 F. Supp. 924, 935 (N.D. Ind. 1967); Presbyterian & Reformed Pub-
lishing Co. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1070, 1082-83 (1982), appeal docketed, No. 1759-
81X (3d Cir. Dec. 23, 1982); Pulpit Resource v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 594, 610-11
(1978); B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 357 (1978). See generally
Tress. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1960).
72. Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1070, 1082
(1982), appeal docketed, No. 1759-81X (3d Cir. Dec. 23, 1982); B.S.W. Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 356-57 (1978). See Tress. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1960).
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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Making money is seldom an end in itself; ordinarily, it is
merely a means (activity) to an end (purpose). A profit is made
not for the sake of making a profit, but so that the profit may be
put to some use. If an organization uses the profit it makes from
an activity that directly accomplishes an exempt purpose in a
manner consistent with the organization's avowed exempt pur-
pose, then the making of the profit is a means to an exempt end,
and there is no nonexempt commercial purpose.
For example, if an organization uses its profits to finance
the expansion of a business activity whose operation directly
accomplishes an exempt purpose, then the organization should
retain its tax exempt status. Similarly, use of profits to fund
non-self-supporting activities in furtherance of the organiza-
tion's exempt purposes should not endanger exempt status.73 If,
on the other hand, the profit is used for some nonexempt pur-
pose, such as the private benefit of those in control of the organ-
ization' or mere accumulation of wealth for its own sake (the
rare case of making money as an end in itself),75 then the organi-
73. Both expenditures for capital improvements and expenditures for non-self-sup-
porting activities would not be deductible by the organization and thus would not reduce
taxable income. The improvements would, of course, have to be capitalized. I.R.C. § 263
(1982). Depreciation deductions might or might not be available, depending on the
nature of the improvements, but a full current deduction would not be possible.
Amounts spent on non-self-supporting activities would not generally be deductible,
because expenditures that are not profit motivated are not deductible expenses under
either § 162 or § 212. The unavailability of deductions for these two types of expendi-
tures means that an organization may spend all its receipts for exempt purposes and yet
have taxable income, assuming that it is not tax exempt. Such an organization may have
income in a tax accounting sense, when in fact, it has no receipts that are not spent in
furtherance of its exempt purposes. See Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976), arguing that
computing the "net income" of tax exempt organizations "would be a conceptually diffi-
cult, if not self-contradictory task." Id. at 307.
74. This would violate the statutory prohibition against the inurement of an exempt
organization's net earnings to the benefit of private individuals, as well as the require-
ment that an exempt organization be operated exclusively for exempt purposes. I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) (1982).
75. Even though § 504 of the Code, which expressly prohibited unreasonable accu-
mulations by exempt organizations, was repealed by § 101(j)(15) of the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, the courts have properly continued to deny exempt status to organizations that
have accumulated earnings far beyond any demonstrable exempt purpose-such as
planned expansion-for the accumulation. See, e.g., Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel
Worker Soc'y v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Western Catholic Church v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 196 (1979), aff'd, 631 F.2d 736
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981). The principles involved are somewhat
similar to those that apply to the accumulated earnings tax on nonexempt corporations
under I.R.C. §§ 531-37 (1982). Although the accumulation of wealth for its own sake is
not an exempt purpose, the Service and the courts must be careful not to penalize orga-
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zation has a substantial nonexempt purpose, and it is not enti-
tled to exemption.
The critical issue, under the purpose analysis mandated by
both the Code and the regulations, is not whether the organiza-
tion intends to make a profit, but what it intends to do with that
profit. This is not to say that any business may be exempt, so
long as its profits are used for charitable purposes. Section 502,
dealing with "feeder" organizations, expressly provides that an
organization does not qualify for exemption merely because all
its profits are paid over to one or more exempt organizations.7
Section 502 does not state that an organization whose profits are
used for exempt purposes is not exempt; it simply says that
something more is required for exemption. The something more
is that the organization's business activity must directly accom-
plish an exempt purpose, independently of how it may use its
profits.7  This is ordinarily the case with organizations such as
hospitals, schools, and religious publishers. It is not ordinarily
the case with steel mills, automobile manufacturers, and night
clubs. 78
An exempt organization whose activities directly accomplish
an exempt purpose must finance its operations, including any
planned expansion, in some manner. It costs money to run a
hospital, a school, or a religious press. Nothing in section
501(c)(3) disqualifies an organization that chooses to finance its
operations through charging fees for its goods and services, as
long as any profits are used to further the organization's exempt
purposes.
nizations whose accumulations are for exempt purposes, such as expansion. The Service
acknowledged that expansion plans can justify accumulations by an exempt organization,
when it approved the accumulation of profits for expansion by an exempt hospital. Rev.
Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 118 (amplified by Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94).
76. A feeder organization is one that carries on a trade or business for a profit and
pays all of its profits to one or more exempt organizations. I.R.C. § 502(a) (1982).
77. See Edward Orton, Jr., Ceramic Found. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 147, 161-62
(1971).
78. The typical steel mill, automobile manufacturer, or night club is not organized
or operated for any of the exempt purposes enumerated in section 501(c)(3). On the
other hand, the statutory focus on purposes, rather than activities, means that few kinds
of business operations are inherently nonexempt. In this regard, see Golden Rule Church
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 719, 731 (1964), holding that a church subsidiary that
operated several businesses was exempt. The church's businesses included a sawmill, a
resort, a laundry, a ranch, and a nursery, all of which were operated to demonstrate that
the church's teachings were applicable to the business world. Id. at 723-24. The court
was influenced, however, by the fact that the business operations were consistently non-
profitable. Id. at 730-31.
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B. The Approach Places an Unwarranted Emphasis on
Competition with Nonexempt Organizations
One of the factors frequently mentioned by the courts as
evidence of a nonexempt commercial purpose is competition
with nonexempt, for-profit enterprises.7 9 The importance of such
competition may loom even larger as a practical matter than as a
theoretical one. For example, the Service regularly challenges
the exempt status of religious publishers, which have considera-
ble competition from nonexempt publishers.8 0 By contrast,
exempt organizations just as commercially engaged as religious
publishers, but with little or no competition from nonexempt
organizations, are seldom if ever challenged by the Service
because of their business activities. Hospitals,8 ' and educational
organizations such as schools, colleges, professional and trade
schools, 2 and museums, zoos, planetariums, and symphony
orchestras, normally charge fees for their goods and services. Yet
the Service rarely, if ever, contends that one of these organiza-
tions fails to satisfy the operational test of section 501(c)(3)
because it has a nonexempt purpose of operating a business for
profit. This is true even though a major hospital or university
may be much more efficient and business-like (that is, have
more commercial characteristics) than a small, struggling reli-
gious press. The difference in treatment appears to result from
the fact that hospitals, schools, and museums have relatively few
nonexempt competitors, whereas religious publishers have many.
Apparently the Service is not troubled by organizations with
commercial hues when they are engaged in fields that tradition-
ally have been considered charitable. But similar commercial
hues do trouble the Service when exhibited by organizations
engaged in fields where operation of businesses for the private
79. See, e.g., Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800, 806 n.11 (Ct. CI.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962); Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1070, 1085 (1982), appeal docketed, No. 1759-81X (3d Cir. Dec.
23, 1982); Plumstead Theatre Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1324, 1332 (1980),
aff'd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982); Pulpit Resource v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 594, 611
(1978); B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 358 (1978).
80. See supra notes 33-55 and accompanying text.
81. See discussion of Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 and Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2
C.B. 94, supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. The hospital ruled exempt in Rev.
Rul. 83-157 furnished its services only to those who were able to pay for them, and oper-
ated at a profit.
82. All these kinds of organizations are listed in Tress. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii)
(1960) as types of exempt educational organizations.
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benefit of their owners is the norm. The reason may be nothing
more than an instinctive reaction. A school or hospital has no
trouble with the Service because Service officials are accustomed
to thinking of schools and hospitals as exempt, whereas a reli-
gious publisher has difficulties because Service officials think of
publishing houses as commercial enterprises operated for the
private benefit of their owners. This suggests the rather strange
possibility that if, for example, hospitals organized and operated
for the profit of their owners should eventually become the
norm, exempt hospitals will be in danger of losing their exemp-
tions, even if their activities and purposes have not changed in
the least.8 3
When Congress enacted the tax on unrelated business
income 4 in 1950, it did so with the purpose of curbing what it
perceived as unfair business competition between exempt and
nonexempt organizations. 5 Prior to 1950, exempt organizations
paid no federal income tax on their income from businesses,
even if the business activities had no substantial relation to the
accomplishment of their exempt purposes." Nonexempt com-
petitors complained that tax exemption on business profits gave
the exempt organizations an unfair competitive advantage."
Exempt organizations could use the profits they did not pay in
taxes to cut prices or to expand their business operations. Con-
cerned with the problem of unfair competition, Congress
imposed a tax on the unrelated business income of exempt orga-
nizations. The tax does not apply, however, to profits from a
business if the business activities are substantially related to the
83. But see Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 1417 (1980) (raising the possibility that the nonprofit form actually fits no hospi-
tals). Cf. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL DATA BOOK AND
GUIDE TO SOURCES STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984, at 113 (104th ed.
1983). Nongovernmental nonprofit hospitals (nonprofit in the sense of not being oper-
ated for the private benefit of their owners) outnumbered for-profit hospitals, 3,339 to
730, in 1980. Id. For-profit hospitals had 87,000 beds in 1980, compared with 693,000
beds for nongovernmental nonprofit hospitals. Id. The number of for-profit beds
increased at a faster rate than nonprofit beds between 1970 and 1980 (although the
increase in for-profit beds was less in absolute numbers than the increase in nonprofit
beds). Id. In 1970 for-profit beds numbered 53,000, while nongovernmental nonprofit
beds numbered 592,000. Id.
84. I.R.C. §§ 511-14 (1982).
85. See infra note 89.
86. The most celebrated example was New York University's noodle factory, which
was the subject of C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
87. Eliasberg, Charity and Commerce, Section 501(c)(3): How Much Unrelated
Business Activity?, 21 TAx L. REV. 53, 74-76 (1965).
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accomplishment of the organization's exempt purposes."8
According to the Treasury Department, "[t]he primary objective
of adoption of the unrelated business income tax was to elimi-
nate a source of unfair competition by placing the unrelated
business activities of certain exempt organizations upon the
same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which
they compete." 9
A logical inference is that the unrelated business income
provisions embody Congress' entire response to the unfair com-
petition problem, and that the Service and the courts should not
try to inject unfair competition considerations into interpreta-
tions of section 501(c)(3). If a business does not generate an
unrelated business income tax because its conduct is substan-
tially related to the accomplishment of an organization's exempt
purposes, that business should not endanger the organization's
exempt status under section 501(c)(3). Congress determined
that, whatever problems of unfair competition were caused by
substantially related businesses, they were not sufficient to jus-
tify taxing those businesses. The legislative history of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 so states: "A business competing with tax-
paying organizations should not be granted an unfair competi-
tive advantage by operating tax free unless the business contrib-
utes importantly to the exempt function."'9  Thus, the
competitive advantage of a business that contributes impor-
tantly to the exempt function has been sanctioned by Congress;
such a business is not subject to the tax on unrelated business
income. If the competition problems are insufficient to justify a
tax on the profits of a substantially related business, they are
certainly insufficient to justify a complete denial of exemption."
88. I.R.C. § 513(a) (1982). The conduct of a business is not substantially related to
the accomplishment of an organization's exempt purposes merely because the organiza-
tion devotes the profits from the business to exempt purposes. Id. See supra notes 17-19
and accompanying text.
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1976). For legislative history indicating Congress' con-
cern with unfair competition in enacting the tax on unrelated business income, see S.
REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 483, 504; H.R.
REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 408.
90. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 44, 50, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1695 (emphasis added). The Tax Reform Act of 1969 expanded
the categories of exempt organizations subject to tax on their unrelated business income.
91. An attractive feature of the tax on unrelated business income is that it permits a
compromise, rather than an all-or-nothing result. The Service and the courts may feel
less need to deny exempt status to organizations engaged in unrelated businesses when
they can simply tax the unrelated business income. The regulations state that an unre-
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The approach of the Service and of some courts goes
beyond the line that Congress has drawn. They have attempted
to eliminate unfair competition from substantially related busi-
nesses by totally denying exempt status to organizations
engaged in those businesses. This distorts the intent of Congress
by giving related business, which can cause total denial of an
exemption, less favorable treatment than unrelated business,
which generally prompts only a tax on the unrelated business
income. It also ignores the fact that Congress may have had
good policy reasons for not acting to remove unfair competition
caused by related businesses.
By granting exempt status and eligibility to receive
deductible contributions to organizations organized and oper-
ated exclusively for exempt purposes, Congress made a conscious
decision to favor those organizations. Congress may well have
decided to favor those organizations even when there are nonex-
empt commercial enterprises engaged in the same fields. Tax
exemption may be a competitive advantage if there are commer-
cial competitors, but it is an advantage Congress fully intended
to bestow. Perhaps Congress believed that the exempt purposes
enumerated in section 501(c)(3) would be better accomplished
by organizations whose assets were irrevocably dedicated to
exempt purposes, 2 than by organizations designed to earn prof-
its for the private benefit of their owners.
When exempt organizations engage in unrelated business
activity, they are invading the domain of ordinary commercial
lated business will cause denial of exempt status only if operation of the unrelated busi-
ness is the organization's primary purpose. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (1960). (One
commentator has suggested that no amount of unrelated business activity should ever
lead to denial of exempt status. Eliasberg, supra note 87, at 100.) The result, then, is
that the organization is taxed on its unrelated business income, but it is not taxed on
other income, and it is eligible to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions. No
such compromise is possible in the case of substantially related businesses. Since no tax
is authorized under I.R.C. §§ 511-14, it is still all or nothing. That is apparently because
Congress did not feel the need for any compromise in that area; complete exemption for
organizations carrying on substantially related businesses was considered appropriate. In
this regard, see Note, The Macaroni Monopoly: The Developing Concept of Unrelated
Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1280, 1284 (1968), stating
that continued tax exemption for income from substantially related businesses is consis-
tent with the basic rationale of tax exemption. Apparently the Service and the courts are
not so sure, since they continue to deny exempt status because of substantially related
businesses.
92. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (1960), stating that an organization is not
organized exclusively for exempt purposes unless its assets are irrevocably dedicated to
exempt purposes.
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enterprises, and they are entitled to no competitive advantage.
But when ordinary commercial enterprises engage in businesses
that can directly accomplish an exempt purpose-such as oper-
ating a hospital, a school, or a religious press-they have entered
the sphere within which Congress has acted to favor exempt
organizations. The exempt organizations may have a competitive
advantage, but that is the price their commercial competitors
must pay for seeking private gain in fields such as charity, edu-
cation, and religion."' The commercial enterprises, not the
exempt organizations, are the interlopers. Thus, the existence of
commercial enterprises in competition with the substantially
related business of an exempt organization should not affect the
organization's exempt status.
Even if there were a legitimate concern about unfair compe-
tition from substantially related business activities of exempt
organizations, the current approach of worrying about competi-
tion only in fields where nonexempt commercial competitors are
flourishing is. precisely backwards. If there is a competitive
advantage to tax exemption, it is probably greatest in those
areas-such as education-in which there are few or no commer-
cial competitors. The advantages of tax exemption may have
made it difficult for commercial competitors to enter or remain
in those fields. But in areas such as religious publishing, in
which commercial competitors are flourishing, it appears that
tax exemption has not seriously inconvenienced commercial
competitors. If the presence or absence of commercial competi-
tion were a legitimate factor in determining an organization's
qualifications for exemption, it would be the absence of competi-
tion, not its presence, that would make the organization's quali-
fications suspect.
93. There is some question as to whether tax exemption really constitutes a compet-
itive advantage. The supposed advantage of being able to cut prices has been questioned
in Note, Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851, 875-76
(1951). The Note argues that it is unlikely that exempt organizations, which are usually
clamoring for funds, will forego current income in the hope that they can drive out non-
exempt competition after a lengthy price war. The supposed advantage of being able to
use untaxed profits for expansion has also been disputed in Note, Preventing the Opera-
tion of Untaxed Business by Tax-Exempt Organizations, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 581, 591-92
(1962). According to the Note, the ability of an exempt organization to accumulate funds
faster than a nonexempt organization affords no competitive advantage. If an opportu-
nity for profitable expansion exists, taxed businesses can obtain funds in money and
capital markets. Professor Bittker notes that, apparently, no empirical studies have been
done on the question of whether tax exemption actually results in unfair competition. 4
B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INcOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 1 103.3 n.3 (1981).
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Finally, it should be remembered that Congress retains the
power to deny exempt status to organizations engaged in partic-
ular kinds of business activities, if Congress decides that the
interests of commercial competitors so warrant. In HCSC-Laun-
dry v. United States,"4 the Supreme Court interpreted section
501(e) as embodying a congressional decision, made at the urg-
ing of commercial laundries, to deny exempt status to coopera-
tive hospital laundry services. 5 If such responses are needed in
particular instances, they should be made by Congress, not by
the Service or by the courts.
C. The Approach Wrongly Penalizes Efficiency and Success
The characteristics that the Service and the courts object to
as evincing a commercial hue are often nothing more than the
necessary attributes of any efficient and successful large-scale
activity, whether charitable or commercial. The smaller, less effi-
cient, and less successful an organization, the better its chances
of being recognized as exempt.9 6
In Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v. Commissioner,97 the
Tax Court issued a ringing rejection of the Service's contention
that activities of a theater society, such as advertising in news-
papers, selling tickets, and using professional actors, gave the
society a forbidden commercial purpose. The court stated:
"Nothing in section 501(c)(3) dictates that the public find out
about petitioner's performances through word of mouth, that
they be forced to watch amateurs act, or that they be seated
totally free of charge." 8
In Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commis-
sioner,9 however, the Tax Court accepted the Service's argu-
ment that practices such as expanding operations by searching
out new readers, acquiring a larger facility, and paying wages to
workers and royalties to authors, were evidence of a forbidden
commercial purpose. The court paid lip service to the idea that
94. 450 U.S. 1 (1981).
95. Id. at 5-8.
96. The organizations whose exemptions may be spoiled by success are generally
those with commercial competition. A major hospital or university may operate in an
efficient, business-like manner without endangering its exemption; a religious publisher
or a theatrical organization may not.
97. 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
98. Id. at 1332.
99. 79 T.C. 1070 (1982), appeal docketed, No. 1759-81X (3d Cir. Dec. 23, 1982).
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expansion could be for exempt purposes, and purported to reject
the Service's implication that efficiency and success automati-
cally negate exempt status.100 Nevertheless, the court treated the
organization's efficiency and success as factors weighing against
exemption.' 0 '
The perversity of this attitude is apparent. Nothing in sec-
tion 501(c)(3) suggests that organizations are entitled to exemp-
tions only as long as they are small, struggling, and inefficient.
The larger, more successful, and more efficient an organization,
the better it can carry out its exempt purposes. It should not be
penalized for its success. The Service is not likely to revoke
Harvard University's exemption because it is too large, success-
ful, business-like, and efficient; the Presbyterian and Reformed
Publishing Company should be dealt with by the Service on the
same basis as Harvard University.
D. The Approach Allows the Service and the Courts to
Second-Guess Financial Policy Decisions That Should Have
No Bearing on Tax Exempt Status
Always pricing goods or services at or above cost is, accord-
ing to several court opinions, substantial evidence of a commer-
cial purpose. 02 This close questioning of financial policy deci-
sions is a good example of what is wrong with the prevailing
approach to exempt organizations operating businesses substan-
tially related to the accomplishment of their exempt purposes.
It would be consistent with operation exclusively for exempt
purposes for an organization to sell its goods and services below
cost, so that all persons who could benefit from those goods or
services could afford them. It would also be consistent with
operation exclusively for exempt purposes always to charge at or
above cost, so that the organization could be assured of enough
revenue to carry on its operations, to weather future financial
stringencies, or to expand to accomplish its exempt purposes on
a larger scale. Either pricing policy is consistent with operation
exclusively for exempt purposes. Which policy is best for a given
100. Id. at 1087.
101. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 35-55.
102. American Inst. for Economic Research v. United States, 302 F.2d 934, 938 (Ct.
Cl. 1962); Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1070, 1084
(1982), appeal docketed, No. 1759-81X (3d Cir. Dec. 23, 1982); Peoples Translation Serv.
v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 42, 50 (1979); B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352,
359-60 (1978).
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organization is a question that those in control of the organiza-
tion are especially well suited to answer, and that the Service
and the courts are especially ill-suited to answer.
Why then have such pricing policies become a concern of
the Service and the courts? They have assumed that any policy
typical of a commercial enterprise-such as always pricing above
cost-is a mark against exempt status, without even considering
whether that policy might also be one that an exempt organiza-
tion might use in pursuing its exempt purposes.
The Service and the courts should stop asking the irrelevant
question of whether an organization's practices happen to
resemble those of a commercial enterprise, and start asking the
relevant question of whether an organization's practices are con-
sistent, in the context of that organization, with operation exclu-
sively for exempt purposes.
III. CONCLUSION
Section 501(c)(3) does not justify the approach that the Ser-
vice and the courts have taken in searching out supposed nonex-
empt commercial purposes in organizations operating businesses
that directly accomplish exempt purposes. If the following two
requirements are satisfied, the Service and the courts should not
object that an exempt organization operates a business as its
sole or primary activity. The first requirement is that the opera-
tion of the business directly accomplish exempt purposes, and
the second requirement is that any profits be used for exempt
purposes. If those two requirements are satisfied, there can be
no valid objection under section 501(c)(3) to an exempt organi-
zation's business activities.
The resistance to such business activities of exempt organi-
zations is typified by Fides Publishers Association v. United
States.103 In Fides, the court remarked that if an organization
that publishes and sells religious literature at a profit is exempt,
then "every publishing house would be entitled to an exemption
on the ground that it furthers the education of the public."1
This is wrong on two counts. First, it incorrectly assumes that
everything that is published is educational within the meaning
of section 501(c)(3).' 06 Second, and more important, it ignores
103. 263 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1967).
104. Id. at 935.
105. Although it ruled that the definition of education in Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
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the requirement that an exempt organization's earnings must
not inure to the benefit of any private individual. Not every
publishing house would be exempt under the approach of this
article because not every publishing house publishes only educa-
tional material, and because not every publishing house devotes
its profits exclusively to exempt uses. Thus, there is no basis for
the fear expressed by the Fides court. True, every publishing
house that published only educational material and used all its
profits for exempt purposes could qualify for exemption, but
there is no abuse of exempt status in that. That is no more
objectionable than the fact that all hospitals and universities can
qualify for exemption if they devote their earnings solely to
exempt purposes. Such a result is entirely consistent with the
congressional purpose behind section 501(c)(3).
An organization that operates a business directly accom-
plishing exempt purposes, and that devotes all profits from that
business to exempt purposes, does not serve mammon. Its only
master is an exempt one. It is operated exclusively for exempt
purposes, and it should be eligible for tax exempt status as an
organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.
1(d)(3) was unconstitutionally vague, the court in Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States,
631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980) noted that "we by no means intend to suggest that tax-
exempt status must be accorded to every organization claiming an educational mantle."
Id. at 1040.
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